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fromwhichmodern
/'lthough biblicalexegesisand rhetoric,
derivedits firstprinciples,are ancientarts,an
hermeneutics
effortto establishhermeneuticsas a universalscience,and
is ofa
especiallytoextenditsprinciplestothescienceofsociety,
decidedlyrecentorigin."Thereis littledoubt,"statesGouldner,
"thathermeneutics'
rootsin the modernera are traceableto
fertile
Romanticism."1
Whyis thisso, whatmakesromanticism
hermeneutical
for
Gadamer,
Hans-Georg
speculations?
ground
makes this intriguing
a leading authorityon hermeneutics,
about
its
suggestion
origins:
whenthereis
The hermeneutical
clearly
problem
onlyemerges
no powerful
into
tradition
to absorbone'sownattitude
present
itself
andwhenoneis awareofconfronting
an alientradition
to
whichhe has neverbelongedor one he no longerunquestion. . . Historically
it is worthy
of notethatwhile
inglyaccepts.
rhetoric
Greekphilosophy,
hermeneutics
belongstotheearliest
cameto flowerin theRomantic
of the
era as a consequence
moderndissolution
of firmbondswithtradition.2
Gadamerdoes notpursuetheargumentmuchfurther,
yethis
remarkoffersa clue fora potentially
fruitful
line of inquiry.
the
onset
of
romanticism
was
marked
Indeed,
bythe breakdown of a century-old
tradition.Precipitatedby the French
1 Alvin W. Gouldner, For
Sociology:Renewal and Criticismin Sociology(New York:

Basic Books),p. 336.
2 Hans-GeorgGadamer,Philosophical
Hermeneutics
of Califor(Berkeley:University
nia Press,1976),pp. 46, 21.
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Revolution of 1789, a crisis of major proportion swept over
Europe, leaving its indelible mark on virtuallyevery form of
practical and spiritual life. The romantic movement was in
great measure an attempt,inconclusiveand contradictoryas it
might seem, to come to grips with the legacy of the French
Revolution. The revolutioncompelled the reappraisingof the
past and made imperative a conscious stance with regard to
the present. It underscored the historicityand fragilityof the
the revolutionrevealed the contradition.Most frighteningly,
stitutiverole of reason, its uncanny ability to revamp the
natural order of things,whichestablishedman as a participant
observerin the drama of history.The realizationthat man is a
producer as much as a product of society- this major insight
of sociological hermeneutics- was first formulated by the
romanticthinkersin response to the promise and the threatof
the French Revolution.
A few preliminaryremarks on the meaning of "romanticism" as employed in this paper are in order here. The term
has been the subject of an ongoing controversysince the
beginning of this century.3Some critics see little use in it
because "it has come to mean so many thingsthat,by itself,it
- too many differentauthors are lumped tomeans nothing"4
gether under the heading "romanticism,"too antitheticalare
the ideas stamped "romantic,"too uncertain is the time span
encompassing the "romantic movement." What useful purpose, indeed, may be served by bringingunder one head such
unlikely bedfellows as Goethe, Tieck, E. T. A. Hoffman,
Fichte, F. Schlegel, Hegel, Schopenhauer, Kierkegaard, A.
Müller, Marx, and Novalis? Lovejoy's unhappiness with the
term and his preference for the plural form "romanticisms"5
3 The history
is reviewedin René Wellek,Concepts
of thiscontroversy
ofCriticism
(London:
Press,1963),and LilianR. Fürst,Romanticism
(New Haven: Yale University
discussionis stillJacques Barzun'sClassic,
Methuen,1969). The best substantive
and Modern(New York: AnchorBooks, 1961).
Romantic,
4 A. O. Lovejoy,"On theDiscrimination
Poets:
Romantic
inEnglish
of Romanticisms,"
Press,1960),p. 6.
ModernEssaysin Criticism
(New York: OxfordUniversity
5 Ibid.
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are quite understandable. Still, his argument overstates the
case. What is peculiar about romantic thinkers,as Gouldner
rightlynoted, is that "ever since Hegel, romantics have expressed their distance from others by condemning them as
Romantics'."6 It may be prudent to distinguish those consciously advancing the romantic cause (we can call them
"romantics") from those who partake in it without openly
subscribingto its tenets or accepting some of its forms (they
may be called "romanticists"),but to deny Goethe, Hegel, or
Marx a place in the historyof romanticismon account of their
ambivalence about it is to engage in the "petty politics of
cultural history."7Barzun hardly exaggerates when he calls
Faust "a bible of Romanticism" in spite of Goethe's deliberate attempts to put distance between himself and the romantics.8 Hegel's contempt for everything romantic notof Mind is an outstanding
withstanding,his Phenomenology
piece of romantic philosophy, deservedly included by Peckham among the required readings for all studentsof romanticism.9Gouldner's interestin "Marx's Romanticism"10
does no
violence to the historicalrealities,even though it flies in the
face of Marx's well-knownantiromanticsentiments.And certainlya long list of romantic writerscompiled by Isaiah Berlin,11 which features among others Chateaubriand, Kierkegaard, Stirner,and Nietzsche,is no sign of his indifference
to the diversityof their respective views. The greater the
stature of a thinker,the more likelyhe is to be in a class by
himself; classing him together with other romanticistsis not
meant to suggest that he is nothingbut romantic,only thathe
took part in the romantic discourse, shared in the romantic
6 Gouldner, For
Sociology,p. 336.
7 Barzun,
Classic, p. 8.

8 Ibid.

9 Morse
Peckham, "On Romanticism,"Studiesin Romanticism
9 (1970): 218.
10Gouldner, For
Sociology,p. 339; see also The Two .Marxisms
(New York: Oxford
UniversityPress, 1980), p. 192.
11Isaiah Berlin,
"Preface,"in H. G. Schenk, The MindoftheEuropeanRomantics(New
York: Anchor Books, 1969), p. xv.
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contributed
to the
or unwittingly
and wittingly
problematics,
vastfieldof idiomsand meaningswhichsprangto lifein the
of theFrenchRevolutionand signifieda breakwith
aftermath
the Age of Reason.
All this is not to belittlethe formidabletask facingthe
studentof romanticism
seekingto unravelthe unityof the
romanticmovement.This taskis exacerbatedby the violently
statements
emanatingfromallegedromanticists.
contradictory
In the same breathwe findthemassertingthe autonomyof
the individualand the primacyof the whole, the rightto
self-determination
and the dutyto the state,personalresponof tradition.These
forthe futureand the inviolability
sibility
cannotbe simplychargedto the factionaldicontradictions
fortheyare endemicto
visionswithintheromanticmovement,
romantic
thinker;rather,theyshouldbe seen
everygenuinely
dissonanceand
of the "contradictoriness,
as a manifestation
innerconflictof the Romanticmind."12It is to the creditof
such studentsof romanticismas Kluckhohnand Barzun,
Peckhamand Abrams,Wassermanand Schenkthattheyendeavored to grasp the unityunderlyingthe romanticmovement
and ideological
withoutglossingover the artistic,
intellectual,
of its protagonists.
diversity
The followingaccountfocuseson the tensioninherentin
the premisesof romanticthought.Severalof thesepremises
are central to the present study. The firstconcerns the
and is predicatedon the
romanticists'
politicalcommitment
as wellas Revolution. . . wereunited
idea that"Romanticism
in theirimpassionedstriving
forfreedom."13
Deploringrevoto the
committed
remained
violence,theromanticists
lutionary
revolution'semancipatory
goals. The novel elementin their
thatindividualfreedom
politicalreasoningwas thecontention
to socialorder,thatthe formeris grounded
is notantithetical
in the latterand can be fullyrealizedonly in and through
12Schenk, Mind,
p. xxii.
10linn.,
p. w.
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society.The second premisehas to do withthe philosophical
and is based on the preceptthat
assumptionsof romanticism
"the romanticreactionwas a proteston behalfof value."14
Whereasrationalist
philosophysoughtto minimizethe value
in
the romanticthinkers
component human understanding,
it
to
be
the
condition
of
proclaimed
very
objectiveknowledge.
The notionthat knowledgedevoid of interestand a priori
assumptionsis a contradictionin termsis quintessentially
romantic.The thirdidea containedin romanticism
is thatof
"The
of
organicunity.
paradigm 'organic'unity,"accordingto
I willalso
Higonnet,is centralto "romantichermeneutics."15
that
it
is
central
to
the
entire
romantic
in
tradition
argue
sociology,insofaras it entails a new image of societyas
or free discourse.The above preceptsdo not
Gemeinschaft
exhaustthe listof romanticpremises;arguably,though,they
formthe core of the romanticteachingand are signallyimof romanticsociologyand the
portantforthe understanding
hermeneutical
endemic
to itspremises.The prinperspective
cipal taskof thispaper is to place thesein a properhistorical
context.I begin with the examinationof the romanticists'
attitudetowardthe FrenchRevolution.Afterreconstructing
the premisesof romantichermeneutics,
I discussthe circular
natureof reasoningin romanticsocial thought.Next,I anaas an epitomeof the romantic
lyzethe notionof Gemeinschaft
ideal of the futurecommunity.And finally,I share some
thoughtson the continuitybetween romantictheoryand
twentieth-century
interpretative
sociology.
PoliticalUnderpinnings
oftheRomanticMovement

The history
of theromanticmovementis inexorablytiedto
the Revolutionof 1789, whichcontinuedto evoke passionate

14AlfredN. Whitehead,
Scienceand theModernWorld(Middlesex:PenguinBooks,
1938),p. 115.
15M. R.
Boundaries: Friedrich
Higonnet,"Organic Unityand Interpretative
Schlegel'sTheoriesand Their Applicationin His Critiqueof Lessing,"Studiesin
19 (1980): 164.
Romanticism
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response throughoutthe nineteenthcentury.The firstgeneration of romanticthinkersgreeted the news about the fall of
the Bastille with cheers and applause. To commemorate the
happy eventsof July 14, young studentsin Göttingen- Hegel,
Schlegel and Hölderlin- planted a liberty tree. Friedrich
Schlegel ranked the French Revolution with"the greatesttendencies of the age," along with Fichte's philosophy and
Fichte praised the valeurof the French and
Goethe's Meister.16
claimed to have laid the philosophical foundation for what
theyselflesslyfoughtfor in practice.17Wordsworth,deploring
"the baleful influenceof aristocracyand nobilityupon human
happiness and virtue," declared himself a supporter of the
republic.18The feeling of euphoria, however,did not survive
the third year of the revolution. The Terror struck,and almost overnight the mood of the romanticistschanged: enthusiasmgave way to depression, hope to despair, acclamation
to denunciation. The awakening was particularlyrude for the
German romanticists,who saw in the French Revolution the
best hope for libertyin theircountry,stilldeeply ensconced in
the feudal tradition. Even in England, where a good many
libertiesespoused by the French revolutionarieswere in place
for more than a century,the judgment of the three years of
revolutionaryviolence was stronglynegative. "I abandoned
France and her rulers," explained Wordsworth,"when they
abandoned the struggle for liberty,gave themselves up to
tyranny,and endeavored to enslave the world."19By the end
of the centurythis sentimentprevailed among the romantic
thinkers.The firstdecade of the nineteenthcenturywitnessed
the romanticists'turningaway fromcosmopolitanismto patri16Friedrich Schlegel, FriedrichSchlegels Lucinde and the Fragments(Minneapolis:

of MinnesotaPress,1971),p. 190.
University
ttchteönejwechsel
17"FichteanBaggesenAntwort,
April,1795, m JohannGottlieb
(Leipzig:Haesselverlag,1925),pp. 449-450.
18WilliamWordsworth,
"A Letterto the Bishopof Landoff,1793, in TheProse
Works
(Oxford:ClarendonPress),3: 46.
ofWilliamWordsworth
19WilliamWordsworth,
Ò: 2by.
"Letterto a Friend,1821,"in TheProseWorks,
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to monarchism,
fromscientific
raotism,fromrepublicanism
to Christianity
and revelation.
tionality
It is this metamorphosis that accounts for a stillas a soundlyconservative
predominantview of romanticism
movement.Thus in his studyof Goetheand his age, Lukács
withoutthe qualifier"reactionrarelyrefersto romanticism
as
ary";Cobban uses the terms"romantic"and "conservative"
Zeitlin
about
"the
Romanticvirtuallysynonymous;
speaks
Conservativereaction"to the French Revolution;Ruggiero
scolds romanticismfor "promotinga reactionarytype of
and Briefsdeplores
thoughtinspiredbythepureJunkerism";
romanticidealismas "thephilosophyof counter-revolution."20
Mannheimmakesperhapsthe mostelaboratecase forromanticismas a paragonof conservative
thought.In his important
inquiryintothe stylesof social thought,Mannheimidentifies
conservatismwith the distrustof reason and formallogic,
preferencefor qualitativethinkingand dialectics,penchant
for irrationalismand mysticism,
and above all, with the
idealizationof the past: "Actingalong conservative
lines . . .
means that the individualis consciouslyor unconsciously
guided by a way of thinkingand actingwhichhas its own
historybehindit, beforeit comes into contactwiththe individual."21Romanticism,
or "feudalistic
as Mannromanticism,"
heim sometimesrefers to it, with its preoccupationwith
medievalinstitutions,
abhorrenceof radicalchange,and supof
does thenappear to be the
port reactionary
governments,
purestspeciesof conservatism.
- and it cerWhateverthe meritof theabove interpretation
tainlysucceeds in bringinginto focus importantaspects of
- itcannotbe acceptedin itsoriginalform.Mannromanticism
20
Georg Lukács, Goetheand His Age (New York: Grosset & Dunlap, 1969); Alfred
Cobban, AspectsoftheFrenchRevolution(New York: W. W. Norton, 1968), p. 26; Irving
M. Zeitlin,Ideologyand theDevelopment
of SociologicalTheory(Englewood Cliffs,N.J.:
Prentice-Hall,1968), p. 39; Goetz A. Briefs,"The Economic Philosophyof Romanticism,"Journalof theHistoryof Ideas 2 (1941): 279.
21Karl
Mannheim, "Conservatism,"in From Karl Mannheim(New York: Oxford
UniversityPress, 1971), p. 153.
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heim's scheme fails to account for other facets of romantic
thought that cannot be forced under the heading "conservatism."Too perceptivea thinkerto simplyignore the inconsistencies,Mannheim acknowledges "the infiltrationof liberal
ideas into the conservativesystemof thought"and admits that
"liberalismallowed itselfto be penetrated by conservativeelements."22By and large, however, he chooses to explain away
anomalous manifestationsrather than to admit the deficiency
of his scheme. Yet the whole scheme needs to be overhauled if
we are to understand the unique position of romanticismin
postrevolutionaryEurope. The uniqueness of romanticismis
not to be seen in its furnishinga rallyingpoint for the forces
of the past, but in the romanticists'ingenuous effortto enlist
traditionin service of the revolutionaryobjectivesof the present. An interpretationthat paints romanticism as "a onedimensional negation of liberalism and bourgeois society,"23
an interpretationfirstfullyarticulated in Mannheim's Habilitationthesisand stillenjoyingwide currency,fails to grasp the
peculiar status of the past in romantic literature.A simple
return to the past was not seriously contemplated by the
romantic thinkers,certainlynot as a practical option for the
future. An ideal past- an organic state of feudal Europe, an
amiable polis of Greek antiquity,or a harmonious community
of the prehistoricpast- was to be regained on a higher level,
through the negation of the present. The past of the romantics is clearlyan extension of the present,a resource skillfully
manipulated to advance a contemporarycause. As Mead observed in his regrettablyforgottenstudy of romanticthought,
the romanticists"created a differentpast fromthat which had
been there before, a past . . . into which a value has been put
whichdid not belong there before."24The values the romanti22Ibid.,
pp. 167, 139.
AAbteven Seidman, Liberalismand the
Origin of European Social Theory(Berkeley:
Universityof California Press, 1983), p. 101.
24
Century(Chicago: Univerof Thoughtin theNineteenth
George H. Mead, Movements
sityof Chicago Press, 1936), p. 64. On the interfacesof Mead and romanticism,see
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cistsfoundin medievalEurope weretheirown,conspicuously
modernvalues of autonomy,freedom,and dignityof man.
Combinedwiththe ancientvirtuesof courage,honesty,and
duty,these values were thoughtto produce the noble, harmoniousorderof thepast.Nevermindthattheidyllicpicture
of the past was chieflythe phantomof the romanticimaginawas to furnisha convenient
tion;itsfunction
vantagepointfor
an attackon the ills of modernsociety:
thegreataccomwereno fools.Theyrecognized
The romantics
andsawthepowerful
oftheEnlightenment
potential
plishments
Buttheysawhowtheseadvances
ofearlycapitalist
technology.
and enslave
werebeingusedto affect
and industry
in thinking
and behavioras wellas thoseof the
theirownconsciousness
peoplein general.And the[y]. . . soughtto recovertherevoand foughtforthe inof newinventions
lutionary
potential
ofa newsocialorderwhichwasstillin
andformation
formation
transition.25
This is not to gainsaythat criticismcouched in nostalgic
termslends itselfhandilyto reactionary
ideologies.Whatever
the intentof the earlyromantics,theydid provideammunitheirattackson
tionto the ideologistsof PrussianJunkerism;
Francedelayedthe advanceof revolutionary
the institutions
mentof civilrights;and theirrejectionof capitalismhelped to
in Germany
prolongthe agony of industrialtransformation
and elsewhere.Still,it is imperativeto refrainfromsittingin
outsidethe
judgmenton theideologicalnatureof romanticism
context.It is hardlyan accidentthatHegel, a model
historical
in the eyes of some contemporary
of romanticconservatism
wasconsideredin hisowntimeas a liberaland an agent
critics,
his politicalwritingsbeingdenied posthumous
of revolution,
condemned
publication,his influencein Germanuniversities
to eradicationbyFrederickWilliamIV. Nor is it totallyfortuDmitriN. Shalin,"The Romantic
Antecedents
of MeadianSocialPsychology,"
Symbolic
7 (1984): 43-65.
Interaction
25J. Zipes, "The Revolutionary
Rise of the RomanticFairyTale in Germany,"
Studiesin Romanticism16 (1977): 450.
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liberalreforms
itousthattheproponentsof Stein-Hardenberg
weresympathetic
to theromanticcause. As to theromanticists'
we should revociferousoppositionto the Enlightenment,
memberthat,in the nineteenthcentury,the latter'suniverweretransformed
intoa progressalismand cosmopolitanism
sively coercive Napoleonic imperialism,deeply resented
throughoutEurope. The ideologicalunderpinningsof the
romanticmovementwere "neitherof the Rightnor of the
Left."26
The romanticists
lookedto thepastfora modelof the
futurethatwould be "neitherbourgeoisnor feudal."27It is
indicativethatthinkersof such impeccablyliberalcredentials
as Karl Marx,WilliamMorris,GustavLandauer,and Georg
Lukácshave strongromanticbackgrounds.All in all, romantiand resists
cismdefiesan unambiguouspoliticalidentification
side
of
the
it
on
one
to
ideological
attempts put squarely
battlesof the day. Can we say,then,thatit lacks a unifying
politicaltheme?By no means. Löwy missesthispoint,I beof
lieve,when he denigratesthe ideologicalmultifariousness
as "ideologicalhermaphroditism"28
romanticism
("ideological
ambivalence"would be a more fitting
term).Whathe failsto
appreciateis thattheveryattemptto riseabove theideological
extremesof the Rightand the Leftis a unifying
principleof
and
tradition
for
The
romanticists'
romanticthought.
craving
to selfsocial order is inseparablefromtheircommitment
the
survived
This
commitment
and freedom.
determination
decades of reactionand remainedas strongin the second
- thegenerationof Feuerbach
generationof romanticthinkers
and Kierkegaard, Stirner and Marx, Emerson and
Thoreau- as it was at theinceptionof theromanticera, when
is the beginningand
Schellingfirstproclaimedthat"freedom
26Henri

and Romanticism
in EighteenthCenturyPrussia
Brunschwig,Enlightenment
(Chicago: Universityof Chicago Press, 1974), p. 183.
27Gouldner, For
Sociology,p. 324.
28Michael
to Bolshevism(Thetford: Lowe 8c
Löwy, GeorgLukacs-FromRomanticism
Brydon Printers,1976), p. 46.
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the end of all philosophy."29
On thisscore the romanticists
and theclassical
provedto be trueheirsof theEnlightenment
liberaltradition.
Wheretheypartedcompanywiththeirpredbetweenindiecessorswas on thequestionof therelationship
vidual freedomand society.For the philosophersof the Enand theirrevolutionary
heirs,freedomwas indiglightenment
enous,servitudewas man-made;mancame beforesocietyand
made it possiblethrougha social contract.Freedomwas definedhere as freedomfrom,as negativefreedomor liberty
thatshouldbe continuously
guardedagainstthe encroaching
influenceof authority,state,and society.The romanticists
retainedthispreoccupationwithfreedom,but, aftera brief
period of enthusiasmabout the French Revolution,they
abandoned the premisesoí jus naturaeand embarkedon a
path towarda new theory,whichstipulatedthat"a firmgovBrutaland oftenpaternmentis indispensableto freedom."30
entlyrandomviolencein the lateryearsof the revolution(as
exemplifiedin the Septembermassacreof 1792) plantedthe
seeds of doubtin theromanticmindas to theinherentrationand leftto
alityof reason.Liberatedfromexternalconstraints
its own devices,reason showed irrational,if not downright
at odds withthe
suicidal,tendencieswhichwereconspicuously
loftyassumptionsof the philosophersof the Enlightenment.
This traumaticexperiencecompelledthe revisionof the liberal notionof freedom,whichwasdefinedas positivefreedom
or "freedomfor"and proclaimedto be an end productrather
thana starting
pointof humanhistory.
Equallyradicalwas the
in
change outlookon the relevanceof tradition.Caught betweenthe ancien régimetheydeemed obsoleteand the new
ordertheyfoundinimicalto freedom,theromanticists
turned
to a distantpast.The medievalpastof theromanticfancyhad
29F. W. J. Schelling,
VomIchals PrinzipderPhilosophie
(1795) (Leipzig:Verlagvon
Felix Meiner,1911),p. 29.
30G. W. F. Hegel, "The GermanConstitution"
(1779-1802), in Hegel'sPolitical
Writings
(Oxford:ClarendonPress,1964),p. 234.
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littleto do with the stagnant societyin which the individual
was permanentlylocked into his estate; this past was passé for
those who believed thatevery man is entitled"to make oneself
a memberof one of the momentsof civil societyby one's own
act, throughone's energy,industryand skill,"31that "no man
whatever ought to be compelled to any particular class, nor
shut fromany."32The past order which the romanticistscame
to praise and against which theylearned to judge the present
was both harmonious, or in the terminologyof the epoch
"organic," and at the same time perfectlyconducive to individual freedom. No one is forced here to comply; everyone
followsone's native genius; societyremains forevermalleable,
thoughchanges in it come not throughthe abrupt termination
of traditionbut throughthe gradual expansion of itsconfines.
It is a permanent (r)evolution,accomplished throughthe continuous self-rejuvenationof reason.
One can readily see why these romantic musings appealed
to the reactionarypoliticiansin postrevolutionaryEurope. No
less apparent, however,is the liberatingcomponent of romanticism,which proved compatible with the socialistand liberal
currents of nineteenth-century political discourse. The
romantiideological perspective unifyingnineteenth-century
cism grows out of the romanticists'determinationto realize
radical objectives by conservativemeans. Romanticismwas as
much "a negation of the philistinesubstance and life styleof
the emerging bourgeoisie and a protestagainst the utilitarian
ordering of life" as it was "a reactionagainst the backward
feudal ideology and conditions of authoritarianism."33The
romanticistswere "innovators and revolutionists"as well as
"great restorers and wise conservatives."34Their dialectical
31G. W. F.
Hegel, Hegel's Philosophyof Right (1821) (London: Oxford University
Press, 1977), p. 133.
32 G. Fichte,"The Vocation of the Scholar" (1794), in ThePopular WorksofJohann
J.
GottliebFichte(London: Trubner, 1889), 1: 179.
33
Zipes, "RevolutionaryRise," p. 421.
34Talmon, Romanticism,
p. 136.
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commitment
to libertyand order is the broadestcommon
denominatorthat unites otherwisediverse and openly anTo
withtheromanticmovement.
thinkers
identified
tagonistic
be a romantic,we can say, is to believe that freedomcan
coexist with necessity, diversity with unity, arid selfwithits
determination
withsocialorder.Romanticphilosophy,
critical hermeneuticalthrust,was an attemptto workout a
theoreticalfoundationfor the practicalresolutionof these
antinomies.
RomanticPhilosophy
and Hermeneutics

Whiteheaddefined the romanticattitudeas "a protest
againstthe exclusionof value fromthe essenceof matterof
fact."35
This formulacapturesthe gistof the romanticrevolt
againstthedominantrationalist
philosophy.Man,accordingto
the rationalists,
is handicappedin his quest forknowledgeby
innateas well as acquired biases, prejudices,or, in Bacon's
"idols,"whichpreventthe knowerfromseeing
terminology,
The processof underthingsas theyreallyare in themselves.
can
succeed only if the knowerpurges himselfof
standing
The rationalmind,urged Descartes,is active
preconceptions.
to the extentthat is necessaryto curtailits own unwanted
interference
withthe preestablished
order.The universalscience of the future,as the rationalists
envisionedit,called for
faithful
it stressed
observance,notforparticipant
observation;
theactivity
ofresextensa,
notthatofrescogitans.
Once themind
fulfilledits purgativefunction,it was to assume its proper
thepreordainedmovement
of
role,thatis,to recordfaithfully
matteras itrevealeditselfto a disinterested
scientific
observer.
It was thisimpersonal,mechanicaluniversethatprovokedthe
romanticrevolt against rationalismand mechanism.The
romanticists
rejectedthe idea that knowledgecan be freed
35Whitehead, Science, 115.
p.
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fromthe contaminating
influenceof the processof knowing.
Scientificendeavor,accordingto them,is not a quest for
thingsthemselvesand theirprimordialorder; the scientific
methodis notan expedientwayof gettingaround thedistortionsincurredby man'spresencein theuniverse.Quite to the
science'strueaim is to humanizenature,to make it
contrary,
more rational;the scientistis a participantobserverwhose
imprinton the outsideworldis irradicableand whoseproper
role is to restoreman'sresponsibility
forthe worldout there.
The determination
of mechanistic
philosophyto do awaywith
"idols" resulted in the dehumanizationof the process of
understanding.Along withhuman bias, the rationalistsexcised the activeside of knowing,reducingknowledgeto passive reflection.
"The overcomingof all prejudices,"contends
will
"this
Gadamer,
global demand of the enlightenment,
proveto be itselfa prejudice.. . ,"36
of the revolutionin philosophy
Herein lies the significance
initiatedby Kant and continuedby his romanticsuccessors.
The processof knowledge,for Kant, is selective,in that it
choosesamong manyelementsbeforeit shapes themintoan
object.The selectionis guided by our beliefs,preconceptions,
- literallyprejudgments,
withoutwhich
values,and prejudices
means
is thatrationcognitionwould be impossible.Whatit
alistsoverlookedan irreducibleelementof faithor value permeatingour knowledge."I had thereforeto removeknowlThe
edge,"explainsKant,"in orderto makeroomforbelief."37
heart
of
the
a
secretof the transcendental
judgment priori
- is thatit is valuejudgment,thatis, a judgment
Kant'ssystem
whose objectivevaliditypresupposesprior commitmentto
certainbeliefsand values. The taskof philosophicalanalysis,
then,is not to expunge value fromunderstandingand to
eliminateall biasesbutto renderthemconscious,to turnthem
36Hans-GeorgGadamer,Truthand Method(New York:Crossroad,1982),p. 244.
37ImmanuelKant,Critique
ofPureReason(1781) (New York: Anchor,1966), p.
xxxix.
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into premises.This is exactlythe task of philosophicalherthetaskof becomingreflexive,
of uncoveringprejmeneutics,
udices throughwhichour understanding
participatesin the
productionof realityas objectiveand meaningful.When
Goetheinsiststhateveryfactis alreadya theory;whenHegel
mind'sinsistenceon
the unreflexive
exposesas self-deception
Emerson
scolds reason that
dealing with"bare facts";when
separatesthe factfromvalue; whenSchlegeltakesto taskan
empiricistfor his unconsciousrelianceon a transcendental
- whenall thesegiantsof the romanticera raisetheir
outlook
objectionsto unreflexive
reasoningand urgetheinescapability
of prejudgments,
theyspeak the language of hermeneutics.
"This recognitionthat all understandinginevitablyinvolves
some prejudice gives the hermeneuticalproblem its real
thrust."38
as one can gatherfromthe above,
Romantichermeneutics,
is an extensionof romanticphilosophy.Diltheytakesnote of
"was specifically
this fact,pointingout that Schleiermacher
trainedin transcendental
philosophywhichwas the firstto
means
for statingthe problem of herprovide adequate
meneuticsin generaltermsand solvingit."39The principlesof
- the constitutivenature of underromantichermeneutics
standing,the a priori foundationof knowledge,the unreof consciousness,the dialecticsof part and wholeflexivity
belong to the generalfund of ideas developed by romantic
furnisheda new foundationfor
idealism.Transcendentalism
hermeneutics,
movingit away fromthe traditionalconcern
withthe inherentpropertiesof the texttowardthe examinaand
betweenthe interpreter
tionof theconcealedinteraction
hisobject.It helpedto broadenthescopeof thehermeneutical
analysisby includingin its orbitthe entirerange of cultural
and naturalobjects,by treatingall objectiverealityas a text
38Gadamer,Truthand Method,
p. 239.
39WilhelmDilthey,
Selected
Press,1976),p.
(London:CambridgeUniversity
Writings
258.
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waiting to be interpreted. The old hermeneutics urged the
interpreterunravelingthe meaning of the past to free himself
fromthe contaminatinginfluenceof the present; the romantic
hermeneuticsclaimed that the past exists only through the
present. The former insisted that the interpretershould approach his task unbiased and presuppositionless; the latter
assumed that bias is an unacknowledged premise, and all the
knower can hope for is to turn his biases into acknowledged
premises. Where one aimed outward, focusing the interpreter's undivided attentionon the object, the other turned inas a preconditionof successful
ward, postulatingself-reflection
interpretation.All understandingwhich is not dogmatic must
begin with self-understanding.This romantic premise gives
modern hermeneutics its peculiar flavor. It also points to a
distinctlycriticalthrustof modern- romantic- hermeneutics.

TheProjectofSociologicalHermeneutics
Paul Ricouer once observed thatwe live "in a hermeneutical
age,"40 by which he meant modern man's extraordinary
preoccupation with self-reflection,démystificationand criticism. The roots of this now-ubiquitousattitudecan be traced
to the romantic era or, if you will, to 1781, when Kant first
proclaimed that "our age is, in every sense of the word, the
age of criticism,and everythingmustsubmitto it."41The same
sentimentwe find in the two generationsof Kant's successors
who declared a war on "dogmatismas a way of thinking,"42
on
"the dogmatic tendencyin man,"43and demanded "a ruthless
40Paul Ricoeur, The
Philosophy
ofPaul Ricoeur(Boston: Beacon Press, 1978), p. 221.
41Kant,
Critiqueof Pure Reason, p. xxiv.
42G. W. F.
of Mind (1807) (New York: Harper 8c Row,
Hegel, The Phenomenology
1967), p. 99.
43 G. Fichte,Scienceof Know/
edge (1794) (New York: Appleton, 1970), p. 161.
J.
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criticism
"a strenuous reacquisition of
existing,"44
of everything

thatwhichhas once been acquired,"45
"puttingto thetestwhat
has long since passed as establishedtruth."46
Such were the
salvos
of
the
of
the
hermeneutical
criticism,
opening
age
age.
thiswas also the dawningof the new era of
Not surprisingly,
democraticrevolutions.It was the time when philosophical
when
werenourishedbytheflamesof revolution,
disquisitions
bredcriticism
insurself-reflection
and criticism
inspiredopen
rection.The project of romantichermeneuticswas firmly
rootedin the revolutionary
transformations
of the timeand
should be judged in theircontext.
of the FrenchRevolutionwas the
A greataccomplishment
doubt it cast over the divinenatureof the social order and
man'splace in it.In a dramaticfashiontherevolutiondemonstratedthatman'ssocialqualitiesas wellas the socialorderof
whichhe findshimselfa partare emergent.Whetherit consists of slaves and masters, noblemen and commoners,
capitalistsand laborers,the social order is not ordained by
God; nor are its membersearmarkedby nature for their
stationsin life; rather,individualsthemselvesgeneratetheir
social order in the veryprocessof knowing,by subsuming
each otherunder a prioricategoriesand forcingupon reality
of society
The institutions
nomenclatures.
taken-for-granted
be
to
establishedin this manneronly appear
"noumenal,"
are
in
on
their
truth,
own;
they "phenomenal,"that
subsisting
of
on therationalactivities
historical,
is, emergent,
contingent
its members.It is the mind that imposes structureon the
world and assures its objectivereality,and it is entirelyin
man'spowerto destroyhis own creation,to supplantthe old
orderwitha newone. The realizationthatmindis a constituera:
tiveforcewas itselfan offshootof the revolutionary
44Karl Marx, "Letter to Arnold
Ruge, September 1843," in Robert C. Tucker, ed.,
The Marx-EngelsReader (New York: W. W. Norton, 1972), p. 8.
45F. W.
Idealism(1800) (Charlottesville:Univerof Transcendental
J. Schelling,System
sityof Virginia Press, 1978), p. 1.
46S.
(1846) (Princeton: PrincetonUniPostscript
Kierkegaard,ConcludingUnscientific
versityPress, 1941), p. 35.
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That was an age of great destructions.
When the Revolution
which long seemed to be thingsin
came, many institutions
themselves,showed that theywere nothingbut phenomena.
And when new constitutions
and new social ordershad to be
planned,the spiritof the age emphasizedthe factthat,at least
in the social world,it is the officeof human intelligenceto
imposeits own formsupon the phenomena,and to acceptno
but thatof the rationalself.47
authority
The criticalmode of thinkingengendered in romanticsocial
thoughtpredicates thatsocietyowes itsobjectiverealityto consciousness. A fine-spun networkof a priori assumptions and
categories,accordingto thispremise,servesas a ground plan in
termsof which the understandinggenerates the social world.
The understanding does its job without being aware of its
- it is perennially unreflexive,yet
awesome accomplishment
this unreflexivityis the very stuffof which social facts are
made. Social realitypresentsitselfto the mind as a noumenon,
an object unrelated to the subject or a "bare fact," yet this
facticityis apparent: social facts and the social orders they
comprise are brought into being by the work of our understanding. The paradox of the social world is that the society
confrontingus in all its glorious externalityand unyielding
thinghoodis the workof our (un)conscious activity.The whole
edifice of social institutionsrests on the exceedingly shaky
foundation of transcendentalbeliefs and values. "Ultimately
everythingrestson a postulate,"intones Kierkegaard,48even if
this postulate remains incomprehensible to the subject. An
element of incomprehensibility,
opaqueness, and unreflexivity
is at the core of social being expose it, and the whole order
will collapse:
But is incomprehensibility
reallysomethingso unmitigatedly
and evil? Methinkthe salvationof familiesand
contemptible
47Josiah Royce, Lectureson ModernIdealism (New Haven: Yale UniversityPress,
1919), p. 65.
48S.
Kierkegaard,TheJournalsofKierkegaard(New York: Harper & Row, 1959), p.
45
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thenstates
nationsrestsuponit. If I am notwholly
deceived,
of
are
oftenso
andsystems,
themostartificial
man,
productions
artificial
thatone simplycan'tadmirethe wisdomof their
creatorenough.Onlyan incredibly
minutequantity
of it sufand no
remaininviolate
fices:as longas itstruthand purity
...
daresapproachitssacredconfines.
blasphemous
rationality
in
...
the
last
on
some
such
[Everysystem]
depends
analysis
thatmustbe leftin the dark,but that
pointof strength
nonetheless
shoresup and supportsthe wholeburdenand
would crumblethe momentone subjectedit to rational
analysis.49
are not
It should be clear by now that social institutions
immuneto hermeneutical
that
social
facts
are
analysis,
perfectlyamenable to the interpretative
understanding.Moreover, it is quite plausible,as Rickertargued decades ago,50
that the romantic idealists derived their general problematicschieflyfromthe social domain,on whichtheymodwas ineled their treatmentof nature. Transcendentalism
in
which
the
the
travails
of
the
revolutionary
age
spiredby
one's authorshipfirstemergedas a practitaskof recapturing
mode of beingin
cal problem.Dogmatismor the unreflexive
is coterminalwith
the worlddecriedby the romanticthinkers
theinstitutions
of theancienrégime,which,towardtheend of
ceased to be perceivedas naturaland
the nineteenth
century,
rationaland were increasingly
subjectedto critical
inherently
theconstitutive
power
debunkingbythesubjectsrediscovering
is a philosophicalepitomeof the
of reason."Thing-in-itself"
worldin whichtheindividualis no longerat home,wherehe
is not a masterof himselfbut an exile,condemnedto inauthenticexistenceby his own unreflexivity.
He is surrounded
estates,each weighing
by social facts customs,institutions,
on
his
consciousness,
heavily
demandingunequivocalrespect,
threateningto subdue anyone who dares to question their
Alas, this unhappystate of affairsis itselfthe
authenticity.
49
Schlegel, FriedrichSchlegelsLucinde, p. 268.
50Heinnck Rickert,Scienceand
History:A Critiqueof PositivistEpistemology
(1902)

(New York: D. Van NostrandCo., 1962),p. 102.
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workof the mind unconsciousof its agency.To break the
in which the institutionspresent
mold of pseudofacticity
themselves
to the mind,the lattermustbecomeself-reflexive.
When the understandingbecomes transparentto itselfand
acquiresa hermeneutical
insightintoits role as a participant
observerin theorderof things,socialfactslose theirimpeneand submitto rationalchange.
trability
is thusfundamenThe projectof sociologicalhermeneutics
- rediscoveryof
tallythat of rediscoveryand emancipation
authorshipand emancipationfromthe oppressiveweightof
The firstimpetusto this projectcame
obsoleteinstitutions.
fromKant'sCritique
ofPureReasonand theFrenchDeclaration
imof Rightsof Man and Citizen.We findan unmistakable
in Schelling'sattackson
printof thesetwopillarsof modernity
dogmatism and Fichte's belief in the primacy of selfand complain the contemptfor philistinism
determination;
and
Tieck; in the cricencyprofessedby Novalis,Schlegel,
tiqueof alienationby Hegel, Feuerbach,Stirner,and Marx;as
of valuesattemptedby Nietzsche
wellas in the transvaluation
at the close of the romanticera. When Marx announcedthat
(equals criticalphilosophy)byour age . . .
"self-understanding
is a task for the world" and promisedto reformsociety
thatis notclear
consciousness
"throughtheanalysisof mystical
he did notbreaknewground he simplystatedin
to itself,"51
explicitlysociologicalterms the missionof romanticherof the
meneutics.Marx'siconoclasticattitudeis characteristic
were
determined
who
of
romantic
secondgeneration
thinkers,
of
to everyinstitution
to put "thesearchingknifeof criticism"
selfand
Their
diction, expressly political
yesteryear.
differedmarkedlyfromthe studiously
defiant,
consciously
metaphysicallanguage of their romanticpredecessors,but
thesame: manis an author
theirmessageremainedessentially
of the historicaldrama responsiblefor his social worldand
51KarkMarx,"A Correspondence
of 1843,"in KarlMarx:EarlyTexts(New York:
Harper& Row, 1972),p. 82.
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overhiscreationsthroughthe
authority
capableof reclaiming
exerciseof self-reflection.
systematic
TheDialecticofRationality
and Sociality

The enthusiasmwithwhich the romanticists
greeted the
breakdownof theold regime,intenseand sincereas it was in
theopeningdaysof the revolution,
fadedrapidlyas the news
aboutthe increasingly
bloodycourseof eventsin Parisspread
And
when the measuredstaccatoof the
throughoutEurope.
guillotinesheralded to the world the arrivalof the Terror,
mostof the earlysupportersof the revolutionturnedagainst
it, feelingbetrayedand loudly denouncingthe dangerous
shortcutto freedomtaken by the French.Somethingwent
set
terribly
wrongwiththewaytheheirsof theEnlightenment
out to reclaimthe naturalrightsof man. The dawn of the
and
Age of Reason was marredby exemplaryirrationality
seeminglyrandom violence which made a mockeryof the
optimisticforecastsof the prophetsof the Enlightenment.
Freed fromthe restraints
of society,reason looked nothing
likethebenignand constructive
forcein theserviceof natural
law it was hailedto be; instead,it showeditselfto be arrogant,
In the wake of the
vindictive,and utterlyself-destructive.
Terrortheveracity
of a theorythatpicturedsocietyas derivative and incidentalto the affairsof reason was suspect.
Towardtheend of thecenturyitcame underclosescrutiny
by
the romanticthinkers,
who gave a decidedlynew- sociological- turnto thetraditional
discourseon the natureof reason.
to
the
rationalist
mode of thinking,
reason preAccording
cedes societyand needs no help fromit to do thejob it was
entrustedwithby the Almighty.
reason
Societycontaminates
withprejudices idols whichonlymuddlethe pictureof the
preestablishedharmony.To fulfillits mission,reason must
breakthroughtheveilsof societyand open itselfto the natural purityof thingsthemselves
and theirprimordialorder.By
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contrast,the romanticistsconceived of reason as socially embedded and historicallyemergent.Consciousness is permeated
withprejudices and a prioriassumptions,but it is only because
it is so informedand guided by societythatit is the consciousness of man. Humans act consciouslyand rationallywhen they
raise themselvesabove theirimmediate existence,place themselves in the perspectiveof the community,and, armed witha
priori categories and values, transformthe flux of things
themselvesinto an orderlyflowof objectivereality.Socialityis
pluralism is our
implicitin every rational act. "Gemeinschaft,
innermost essence,"52 exclaims Schlegel; what this means is
that only those forcesin man are trulyrational thatare mediated by the community. Rationalitywithout sociality,mind
outside of the human community,is unthinkable.
Already in Kant we find a hint thatreason may be social, at
least in form if not in substance. The transcendentaldomain
contains cognitive constructswhich have no existence apart
from the individual mind but which neverthelesstranscend
personal experience and claim universal validity.Drawing on
these transcendental schemes of understanding, the subject
can induce objectivityinto things withoutvisible recourse to
any authoritybeyond himself,yeteach timehe raises the claim
that the reality in question is objective and meaningful,he
presupposes, however tacitly, that it is universally- valid. When man hazards a universaljudgintersubjectively
ment, "he disregards the subjective private conditions of his
own judgment . . . and reflects upon it from a universal
standpoint(which he can only determineby placing himselfat
the standpoint of others)."53Kant would not say of course
that a priori categories of reason come from society and
change withtime (he obviouslythoughtthese to be innate and
52
und Gemeinschaft:
Studienzur StaatsAuffassung
Quoted in Kluckhohn,Persönlichkeit
derDeutschenRomantik(Halle/Saale: M. Niemeyer Verlag, 1925), p. 5.
53Immanuel Kant,
CritiqueofJudgment(1790) (New York: Bobbs-Merrill,1951), p.
137.
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unalterable),but the veryfactthattheypossessa powertranscendingindividualexperienceand bindingon everyrational
invitesa sociologicalinterpretation.
memberof thecommunity
WithKant'sromanticfollowersthe socialand historicalnature of reason is alreadya matterof unshakableconviction.
Reasonevolveshistorically,
alongwiththehumancommunity,
and embodiesthe collectiveforcesof society,even thoughits
immediateexpressionis individual.The transcendental
power
of mind,the power to convertthingsin themselvesinto objects,is socialin formand content.Beyondthetranscendental
judgment a priori stands a community(real or potential)
whichdelegatesits authorityto its membersand givesthem
confidenceto treatthe realityin questionas objectiveand
meaningful.Everythought,precept,or deed thatpasses the
testof rationality
has its beginningand end in society.Even
the most intimatenotion of self, according to romantic
is of social origins:"The selfperceivesitselfat the
thinkers,
same timethatit is perceivedbyothers.. . . Self-consciousness
existsin itselfand foritself... bytheveryfactthatitexistsfor
anotherself-consciousness;
thatis to say, it is only by being
or
"Onlyby meetingwith,so as
acknowledged recognized."54
to be resistedby,Another,
does theSoul becomea Self.Whatis
Self-consciousness
but to know myselfat the same moment
thatI knowanother,and to knowmyself
bymeansof knowing
and
vice
versa."55
another,
It would be wrong to infer from the above that,while
reason needs societyto performits function,societyendures
on itsown,independently
fromindividualminds.Each society
has an enormousstake in cultivatingits members'rational
- suppressthem,and it withersaway along withthe
faculties
reasoningpowersof individuals.Societyis a perpetuallyrenewed communityof minds accomplishedthroughthe ra54Hegel,Phenomenology,
pp. 661, 229.
55S. T. Coleridge,
quoted in K. Coburn,TheSelf-Conscious
(London:
Imagination
OxfordUniversity
Press,1974),p. 32.
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tional activitiesof individuals. The thesis of the inherent socialityof reason, consequently,requires a dialecticalinversion:
just as reason is social through and through, so is society
permeated with reason. The individual is a responsible
member of society to the extent that he acts rationally,and
society is an objective and meaningful whole as long as its
membersshare rationalesfor action. External and petrifiedas
the social order may seem, it remains a product of ongoing
rationalizationat every moment of its existence. In the language of philosophical hermeneuticsthis propositionreads as
follows:"Whatis rationalis actual and whatis actualis rational.1156

In the sociologicalparlanceit can be statedthisway:"Activity
and mind,bothin theircontentand in theirmodeofexistence,
and socialmind."57Renderedfreely,
are social: socialactivity
thismeans thatsocietypersistsas long as it is projectedinto
actionsof itsmembersand ceasesto existas an
themeaningful
whenindividualsdenyitsinherentrationality
whole
objective
and refuseto abide by the a priorischemesof understanding
in whichit has been traditionally
cast.
that
There is a bodyof opinion,bothpopularand scholarly,
the
to
oblivious
romantics
as
narcissistic,
problemsof
depicts
communityat large, antisocialin theirbasic impulses.This
viewis hopelesslyone-sided.Muchcloserto thetruth,I think,
who contendthat "the longingfor
are those commentators
is one of the mostimportantthemesin Romanticommunity
cism,"58that "in everydefinitesense we can speak of this
True,
philosophy... as one whichis socialin itscharacter."59
and place
are preoccupiedwithself-reflection
theromanticists
but thisromanticconan inordinateemphasison subjectivity,
it is due to
cern does not implyan a-socialbias; if anything,
for
of
sense
acute
the romanticists'
responsibility the fateof
56
of Right,p. 10.
Hegel, Philosophy
57Karl Marx, Economicand Philosophic
Manuscripts
of1844 (New York: International

Publishers,1964),p. 138.
58H. Staten,"Newmanon Selfand Society,"
18 (iy/y):by.
in Romanticism
Studies
59Mead, Movements
of Thought,p. 147.
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thecommunity
and reflectstheirbeliefthatthe actionsof the
individualcount. This goes not only for the championsof
publiccausessuchas Fichte,Hegel,and Marx,butalso forthe
"archindividualists"
like F. Schlegel,Kierkegaard,and Emerson. Even Max Stirner,the prophetof modernegoism,reserves his most eloquent rhetoricfor the descriptionof
"union"- the futurecommunity
of freespiritualbeings.Concern forsocietyis embeddedin the romanticframeof mind.
Whatis different
about the romanticists'
treatment
of society
and reason is the radical mannerin whichtheywelded the
twointoone continuum.The romanticists
foundthe seeds of
at
the
nub
of
consciousness
and
discerned
theimprint
society
of reasonon the fabricof the socialorder.They discovereda
newdomain(theycalledit"transcendental")
wherereasonand
societymeet,becomingone, a realm of what we now call
but the substance
values,the locus of whichis intraindividual
of which is extraindividualand intersubjective.
This is a
realm
all
those
and
paradoxical
comprising
prelogical
largely
taken-for-granted
categoriesin termsof whichwe makesense
of the world and whichtie us togetherinto a community.
Throughthisdomainsocietyentersthe individual,leavinga
thatmakesman trulyhuman.Both readepositof rationality
son and societyappear to be sui generis,yetneithercan exist
tiedto itsother.The twogrow
byitself,and each is inexorably
sometimes
lockedin bitterdispute,sometimespeacetogether,
This reasoning
fullycoexistent,alwaysmutuallyconstitutive.
was a methodological
expressionof the romanticists'
political
of
their
desire
to mediatebetweentheconservaambivalence,
tivethesisand theradicalantithesis.
"Dialectical"and "mediaare
in
romantic
idealism.
tory" virtually
synonymous
The whole approach can be seen as a deft attemptto
safeguardthe emancipatory
legacyof the FrenchRevolution
from its violent excesses by substitutinghermeneutical
of the Enlightenphilosophyforthe shallowcontractarianism
ment.Rejectingthepoliticalideologyof theLeft,theromanticistscontendedthathumansocietyis nota mechanicalaggre-
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gate of individuals but an organic whole, the members of
whichare bound togetherby a continuous thread of tradition,
a way of thinkingand feeling that is ingrained in every mind
and thatcannot be dislodged by revolutionarydecrees. At the
same time,theyshunned the reactionaryideologies and urged
of social change, therebyservingnotice on the
the inevitability
old regime thatthe traditionalwaysof doing
of
the
ideologists
things cannot be petrifiedby repressive measures any more
than they can be legislated by the overzealous guardians of
natural rights.An offshootof this dual political agenda was
their hermeneuticallygrounded social theorywithits dialectical, mediatory stance and a characteristicemphasis on the
organic nature of the relationshipbetween reason and society,
libertyand order, traditionand social change.
Circle
and theHermeneutical
RomanticOrganicism

In the Occidentaltradition,societywas oftencomparedto
an organismand treatedas a wholewhich,as thesayinggoes,
is alwaysmorethanthesumof itsparts.To be sure,thewillof
in settingsocietyin motion,
the individualwas instrumental
but once established,it was to persistas a collectivebody
charged withultimatepower to coerce its membersin the
interestsof the whole. From Plato to Aristotle,throughAugustine and Aquinas, to Hobbes and Saint-Simon,this
searchingfor
metaphorprovideda guidinglightto theorists
an ideal of social peace and harmony.The messageit conveyedwas a simpleone: therewillbe no peace and harmony
untilindividualsare subordinatedto society,as partsof an
organismare subordinatedto the whole.A healthysociety,as
is the one thatis insulatedfromthe
seen in thisperspective,
willsof itsindividualmembers.
The imageof organicsocietywe findin romanticliterature
nature.The individualis cast here
different
is of a strikingly
notonlyas an actorbutalso as an author;he is a self-conscious
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- and duty- tojudge
and criticalbeingendowedwitha right
forhimselfmattersof state.A healthysocietyis not the one
wherethe willof the individualis subordinatedto the willof
societybut wherethe willof the wholecoincideswiththe will
of theindividual.The wholeis morethanthesumof itsparts,
romanticists
concede,but it is also less thananyof itsindividual members.For the humanindividualis a socialbeing,"he
belongsto more than one world . . . traversesmanysystems
and encirclesmanya sun."60He is "the livingspecies,"the
knowerand thesubjectwho "treatshimselfas a universaland
thereforefreebeing";61"to him his species,his essentialnature, and not merely his individuality,is an object of
To cast him as a partindifferent
to the wholeis
thought."62
thereforeto deprivethe individualof his true dignity.The
organicanalogythus loses much of its customarybiological
connotation,becomingmore akin to the metaphorof the
micro-and macrocosm:"The individuallivesin thewhole,the
wholein the individual.. . . Societyis nothingbut social life:
an invisible,
and feelingperson.Each man is a small
thinking,
"Man
is
no
abstractbeing squattingoutside the
society."63
world.Man is the worldof man, the state,society.. . . Man,
muchas he maytherefore
be a particular
individual,. . . isjust
as mucha totalitytheideal society thesubjectiveexistenceof
thoughtand experiencedsocietyforitself."64
The thingthat strikesone mostabout these credal statementsof romanticorganicismis theircircularcharacter:the
wholeis looked at here throughthe prismof its parts,while
the propertiesof the part are explicatedthroughthe whole.
60F. D. E.
s Soliloquies(1800) (Chicago: Open Court,
mâcher'
Schleiermacher,Schleier
1957), p. 47.
61

Marx, Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts, p. 112.

62P.
J. A. von Feuerbach, The Essenceof Christianity
(1841) (New York: Harper &
Row, 1957), p. 2.
63Novalis,
Das Philosophische
Werke(Stuttgart:W. Kohlhammer Verlag,
Schriften:
1960), p. 66.
ö* Karl Marx,
Critiqueoj Hegeis Philosophy
of Right(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1967), p. 131; Economicand PhilosophicManuscripts,p. 138.
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The circle involved in this reasoning is neither vicious nor
unintended. It can be understood as a special case of what
Schelling called "the circle of knowledge," or what is now
betterknown under the name popularized by Schleiermacher
as "the hermeneutical circle." The term refers to a circular
path the mind is forced to travelin pursuitof meaning. Thus
the exact sense of a word becomes clear to an interpreter
through its context, the meaning of a sentence through the
whole text; the text is understood when the author's intent
and a priori assumptions are known, which,in turn, presupposes knowledge of the cultural tradition that shaped the
author's imagination.
To comprehend the total culturalcontext,we have to travel
in the opposite direction,startingwith the larger whole and
makingour way to the individualparts. The understandingen
route to full knowledge thereforetravelsin circles: "Complete
knowledge always involves an apparent circle that each part
can be understood only out of the whole to which it belongs,
and vice versa. All knowledge that is scientificmust be constructed in this way."65Schleiermacher did not explore the
implicationsof this principle for the studyof society;nor did
his sociologically minded contemporaries draw on his hermeneutical writings.Still, we can say with confidence that
Schleiermacher's theory of the hermeneutical circle and
romanticsociologyshare a common heritageof transcendental
idealsm and help appreciably to illuminate each other. The
principle of the hermeneutical circle, Schleiermacher contends,covers all formsof intercourse,past and present,where
people make sense, exchange meaning, and produce order
out of seemingly incongruous individual acts. Social intercourse, as seen in this perspective,is the hermeneuticalprocess whereby individuals produce a sense of the whole and
establishthe universe of meaning intelligibleto every participant.
65F. D. E. Schleiermacher,Hermeneutics:The HandwrittenManuscripts(1805-33)

(Missoula:ScholarsPress,1977),p. 42.
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By the same token,societyis a universeof discourse.The
term"universe"(literally,
one verse)favoredby the romantic
thinkers
is veryindicativein thisrespect:it hintsat the Logos,
theWordthatunitesdisparateindividualsintoa socialwhole.
To be grasped hermeneutically,
this whole must be "lived

through[erlebt]and not just apprehendedand explained[erkannt

und erlernt]11;
it mustbe studiedbythe knowerwith"a feeling
scholarapproThe hermeneutical
forvalue and meaning."66
universe
of
meaninggeneratedby
priatesas his own the
actionsof individothers.He learnsto discernthe meaningful
state.Cut down
the
of
uals behindthe mostrigidinstitutions
to size by his interpretative
gaze, the statewillno longerawe
him withits Leviathanicvastness;rather,he will see it as a
livingreality.Societywillunfoldbeforehiseyesas a processof
articulationin the course of whichindividualsgrasp their
identitiesas membersof the same universeof meaning.The
successivegenerationsof individualspartakein thisprocess,
bound by a commonheritageof languageand meaning,yet
neverfailingto leavea markon it.Whiletheycontinueto rely
on customarytermsand apply time-honored
nomenclatures,
societypersistsas a patternor structurewithall the appearThis is just an appearance,
ance of an eternalthing-in-itself.
however.Society'scustomarybeing is routine,not extemwho are not
poraneous;it is perpetuatedby the participants
bound irrevocablyto the terms of their discourse. New
are devisedand broughtto bear on the familnomenclatures
iar situations,
assuringthe flowof change.Whatthismeansis
that"justas societyproducesmanas man,so is societyproduced
by him."67
If thereis a single ideologicalimperativeunderlyingthe
to
circularmold of romanticthought,it is the determination
place the individualand societyon equal footing.Behindthe
BBAdam H. Müller, Die Elementeder Staatskunst(1809) (Jena: Verlag von Gustav
Fischer, 1922), p. 16.
h<Marx, Economicand PhilosophicManuscripts,p. lô/.
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organic imagery of romantic social theory one senses the
craving for freedom qualified by responsibility,the longing
the
for continuitypunctuated by change. Man-the-microcosm,
part coequal to the whole, the species being this unmistakably romantic terminologyhas all the markings of the postrevolutionaryera. It reflectsthe sentimentof those who reject
the revolutionaryand the reactionaryalike. The language of
romanticismconferson the individuala crushingresponsibility
for the well-beingof the whole society.At the same time, it
stipulates that man's liberty is contingent on his ability to
embrace the whole, to incorporate its ways into his self. In
choosing thislanguage, the romanticistsconsciouslybreak with
the classical dichotomyof the individual and society,for which
they substitutea dialectical view that posits the two as thesis
and antithesis,as aspects of the same process of the production of social reality. The species being celebrated by the
romanticistsis a conscious being, willinglysubmittingto the
necessityof law, not because this law is ordained and enforcedby an externalauthoritybut because it stands to reason.
A sovereign and citizen at the same time, he is, above all, a
self, a subjective being of society conscious of itself: "The
Romantic philosophy pointed out that the self, while it arises
in the social experience, also carries withit the veryunitythat
makes societypossible, . . . that societyis nothingbut an organization of selves."68

as an Ideal ofFreeDiscourse
Gemeinschaft

formedin manya head by the
The image of Gemeinschaft
on
the
literature
subjectis that of a communityof
prolific
individualsbound togetherby personal,emotionalties,going
leisurelyabout the businessof life,insulatedfromthe hustle
and generallyantithetical
and bustleof industrialcivilization,
68Mead, Movements
of Thought,pp. 125, 101.
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to thespiritof modernity.
The impression
of an antimodernist
bias is exacerbatedbythemedievalsymbolism
thatcropsup in
the rhetoricof Gemeinschaft.
Contrastedto the latteris the
image of an impersonal,money-bound,
legalisticGesellschaft
the
modern
of
life.
The
final conclusion
symbolizing
way
seems inevitable:one is dealing witha solidlyconservative
idea, masqueradingas a historicaldescriptionbut intended
chieflyas ideologicalammunition
againsttheforcesof moderand
social
This
common
view,much of which
nity
change.
originatesin neoromanticliterature,does not withstanda
criticalexamination.
That theromanticists
spokein hostiletermsabouttheage oí
and scornedbourgeois
the machine,despised utilitarianism,
goes withoutsaying. It is also true that they
philistinism
praised the virtuesof medievalcultureand bemoaned the
nottruethatthe
passingof theorganicstate.It is emphatically
the revival of
for
romanticistsentertainedserious hopes
as such.
or thattheyrejectedmodernity
medievalinstitutions,
normaan
was explicitly
The romanticnotionof Gemeinschaft
tive constructwhose criticaledge was directedagainst the
reifiedconditionsof modernlife.The unfoldingof bourgeois
societyaccordedill withromanticideals,and as the gulfbetween these ideals and bureaucraticrealitieswidened, the
did nothesitateto denouncewhattheyperceived
romanticists
The romanticidealists
of socialintercourse.
to be a perversion
longedfora socialorderthatwouldbe neitherbourgeoisnor
feudal. Their views were anticapitalist,insofar as the
withthe degradation
capitalismof the timewas synonymous
and
buttheywerealso antiauthoritarian
of humanconditions,
thereforeinimicalto the spiritof the Middle Ages. Their
and capitalismdid not blindthemto
of industrialism
mistrust
the emancipatory
potentialof the machine.And theirconwas morethanoffsetbytheir
temptforbourgeoisphilistinism
deep respectforthefreedomsof conscienceand religionthat
werebourgeoisto the core. Call themUtopianor idealisticif
you will,but not reactionary.Even the label "conservative"
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does not fullyapply to the proponents of Gemeinschaft,
whose
commitmentto the ideal of free discourse was nothing short
of revolutionary, and whose main target- bureaucratic
- was as sure a sign of modernityas therecould be.
ossification
The reification of the state was the main target of the
romanticcritique in the 1830s and 1840s. So strong was the
antistatesentimentin this period that it is sometimestaken as
a sign of a break between the firstand second generationsof
romanticists. The split, however, is largely apparent. All
romanticistswere propelled by the same longing for an organic relation between man and society.The romanticistsof
the 1840s turned against the state only aftertheirhopes for its
imminenttransformationinto an organic whole were dashed.
The iconoclasticattitudetoward the stateand bureaucracywas
already evident in early romanticswho lived long enough to
witness the distortionof their ideals in the Napoleonic and
Prussian states. As early as 1823 Schlegel lamented that the
modern state resembles "an all-directingand all-ruling law
- whose sovereign power should
machine- and decree factory
subjugate all thingsdivine and human. . . ."69An echo of these
jeremiads can be heard in Marx's attack on "the spirit of
bureaucracy" permeating modern society,Stirner'sphilippics
against the state as a "true personality"more real than the
individual,as well as in the antistatistdeclarationsof Emerson.
The target of this criticismwas not so much the state as the
stiflingeffectof the bureaucratic social order on the individual. A specimen, a member of a class, modern man seemed to
the romanticistsof the second generationa bittercaricatureof
the image of "the livingspecies" theycherished so much: "The
individuals have only the value of specimens of the same
species or genus; . . . what you are ... as a unique person must
be- suppressed."70"The individuals of a class [exist] only as
69Quoted in H. G. Schenk,"Leviathanand the EuropeanRomantics,"
Cambridge
Journal1 (1948): 247.
70Max Stirner,
TheEgo andHis Own(1845) (New York: Harper& Row,1971),p.
215.
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average individuals,only in so far as theylived withinthe
in which
conditionsof existenceof theirclass- a relationship
but
members
of
a
class."71
individuals
as
not
as
theyparticipate
"Our age has forsakenthe individuals.. . . There are no
more individualsbut onlyspecimens.. . . Man's kinshipwith
deity[is forgotten]."72
Underlyingall these lamentationsis a themethathas be- the themeof
come closelyassociatedwithromanticthought
Reificationis a pathologicalsympalienationand reification.
tomof the modernage, a statein whichsocietyappears to its
and
membersas a noumenon,an externaland coerciveentity,
not as a livingwhole responsiveto its members'needs and
one here as an omnipotentbeing
wishes.The stateconfronts
to be revered,obeyed,and fearedby mere mortals.In these
reifiedconditions,freediscourseis greatlyimpeded:it grows
compulsive,is marredby deep enmitybetweenthe particiThe individualis
pants,and is subjectto frequentbreakdowns.
forcedto takepartin thisdiscourseagainsthiswill,producing
sense thatmakeslittlesense to him personally,generatinga
realityhe experiencesas a threat.Alienatedfromhisuniversal
essence,he is reduced to a cog in a superhumanmachine.
Life, reason, power- everything that belongs to the
- is delegatedto thislifelessautomatonthathovers
individual
in the Platonicrealmof everlasting
beings,exhortingmen to
on itsbehalf.The rootof the modernpredicaselflessefforts
the fact
as
romanticists
saw it,is reason'sunreflexivity,
ment,
that"we firstshare the life by whichthingsexistand afterwardssee themas appearancesin natureand forgetthatwe
have shared theircauses."73The weightof social facts,magnifiedbythepowerof tradition,
preventstheindividualfrom
on thewaythingsare. To challengethe
seeinghisownimprint
71Kark Marx, The German
Ideology(New York: International Publishers, 1947), p.

75.

72 Sjziren
Kierkegaard, The Point of View of My Work as an Author: A Report to History
(1848) (New York: Harper & Row, 1962), p. 111.
7} R. W.
Emerson, Emerson's Essays (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell, 1961), p. 46.
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realityof socialfacts,he wouldhave to questiontherationality
and goodjudgmentof otherbeingswithwhomhe partakesin
thesamesocialintercourse.
The widerthesocialdiscourseand
the community
of assumptionsbehindit, the more thinglike
thesocialreality,
and thegreaterthefearof committing
lapsus
and many
judicii.No wonder"mankindis shyof self-analysis,
people trembleslavishlywhen theycan no longerdodge the
question . . . what they have become, and who theyreally
are. . . . The spell of lifeand of the worldis upon them."74
It is againstthe backdropof thisheartlessworldthatwe
whoseroots
shouldjudge the ideal of an organiccommunity,
the romanticists
soughtin the past but whosefullrealization
the
future.The termGemeinschaft
had not yet
tied
to
they
acquireditscommonmeaning,butthevisionof a harmonious
it had come to signify
was alreadyin place. Fichte
community
"the
Schleiermacher
called it "the universalcommonwealth,"
Müller
"an
of
free
organicstate,"
community
spiritualbeings,"
Stirner"union,"Thoreau "perfectand
Marx "communism,"
gloriousstate,"Emerson"a nationof men unanimouslybent
in a numberof important
on freedom."Differing
respects,the
authorsof theseprojectsagreed on one keypoint:the society
of the futureshould be a universalcommunity,an everexpandinguniverseof discoursethatexistedforitsown sake,
excluded no one, and drew everyhuman being in its orbit.
The foundationof thissocial order would not be the social
Social Con"butan ever-originating
contractof thephilosophes
and
at
is
an
alliance
that
tract,"
everymoment
"perpetually
renewed and therebyreestablishedthroughnew freedoms
that springto life along the old ones."75"It is not another
State . . . that men aim at, but theirUnion, this ever-fluid
The
or union."76
standing. . . intercourse
unitingof everything
newsocialordercreates"thereal basisforrenderingit impos74Schleiermacher,
Soliloquies,
p. 26.
'° Coleridge,in Kathleen
or 1oronto
Coburn,Inquiring
òpint(loronto: University
Press),p. 316 and Müller,Elemente,
p. 147.
76Stirner,
Ego, pp. 138, 212.
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siblethatanythingshould existindependently
of individuals,
in so faras thingsare onlya productof the precedingintercourse of individualsthemselves."77
How can thisideal be realized?A basicpremiseof romantic
- already
tics- reason is social, societyis rational
hermeneu
suggestsan answer:If it is truethatreifiedsocialinstitutions
are "thoughts[that]had become corporealon theirown account,"thatthe stateis "a fixedidea . . . thathas subjected
then to bring down ossifiedsocial reality
man to itself,"78
in theobjectivity
of the
reasonmustrecognizeitsinvolvement
The knowerconsocialworld it mustbecome self-reflexive.
when
he
of
the
state
the
Leviathan
appropriatessocial
quers
withit. The species
realityas his own and refusesto identify
of itself,man
conscious
of
a
being, subjectivebeing society
to bring about
only needs to alter his self-consciousness
in
"The
idols
exist
throughme; I need only
changes society:
refrainfromcreatingthemanew,thentheyexistno longer."79
The foremosttaskof the day is "self-examination:
becoming
consciousof oneself,not as individualsbut as mankind."80
is firstaccomplishedby a
This taskof criticalself-reflection
greatman. A seer,a prophet,a rebel- a greatman is always
an individualwho managesbeforeothersto breakthespellof
him fromother
oppressivesocial reality.What distinguishes
disaffectedindividualsis his abilityto penetratethe sacred
a priori,to cast shadowon the
domainof the transcendental
rationalityof a tradition,to effectthe
taken-for-granted
"Transvaluation
of All Values."81The romantichero is a virhe does not
and self-transcendence;
tuoso of self-reflection
future
he
casts
the
the
forecast
future,
byrecastingold
merely
new
ones. Singleschemesof thoughtand broadcastingthe
77Marx, German
Ideology,p. 70.
78Stirner,
Ego, pp. 237, 59.
79Ibid.,
p. 223.
011
FriedrichNietzsche,TheWilltoPower(1901) (New York: Vintage Books, 1968), p.
316.
81FriedrichNietzsche,"The
Genealogy of Morals," in The Birthof Tragedyand The
Genealogyof Morals (1887) (New York: Doubleday, 1956), p. 296.
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handedlyhe can supplythe versesforthe futureuniverseof
discourse."The givenactualityhas completelylostitsvalidity
[for him]; it has become for him an imperfectformwhich
. . . [He] has advanced beyond the
everywhereconstrains.
reach of his age and opened a frontagainstit."82His task,
however,is notfullyaccomplisheduntilhe isjoined byothers,
that is, until the awakening from the dogmatic slumber
and selfspreadsthroughsociety.That is whenself-reflection
coinci"the
when
into
translate
change,
revolutionary
change
and of humanactivity
dence of thechangingof circumstances
A
or self-changing[transpires]as revolutionary
practice."**
on a mass scale,a
genuinerevolutionis a crisisof objectivity
humanbeof
alienated
an
of
army
practicalaccomplishment
ings refusingto subsume themselvesunder the customary
and to lend their faces to dramatizingthe
classifications
familiarsocial realityas objectiveand meaningful.Revolutionarylabor denaturalizesthe social order, converting
backintoconcretehistoricalphenomena.
thingsin themselves
And it accomplishesthisfeatnot throughphysicalforcebut
throughthe powerof reason.
It is strikinghow thoroughlyconvinced the romantic
idealistswere in the peacefulnatureof theirendeavor.The
most hot-headedof them were at pains to emphasize the
peaceful character of their revolution. The radical
of society,insistedMarx while he was still
transformation
undertheswayof romanticidealism,involvesnothingelse but
the
reform
of consciousness,
[which]consists
solelyin lettingthe
it from
worldperceiveits own consciousness
by awakening
to it itsownactions.. . .
in explaining
aboutitself,
dreaming
of mystical
con. . . through
of consciousness
Reform
analysis
. . . Self-understanding
... is
sciousness
thatis notcleartoitself.
thetaskfortheworldand forus. Whatis at stakeis a confes82Sjzfren
Kierkegaard,The ConceptofIrony(1841) (Bloomington: Indiana University
Press, 1965), p. 278.
8:JMarx, German
Ideology, p. 198.
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sion,nothingmore.To get its sinsforgiven,
humanity
only
needsto describethemas theyare.84
Just that- the confession and the reform of consciousness- and the whole of societywill be transformed,
as if
more
by magic,into somethingmore rationaland infinitely
humane.Thoreauand Emersoncould notagreemore."Peaceable revolution"is the termThoreau aptlyused to describe
the revoltof reason againsta societythat had become imperviousto the wishesof its members("civildisobedience"is
itsother,morefamiliarname): "In fact,I quietlydeclarewar
withthe state,aftermy fashion.... I simplywish to refuse
allegianceto the state,to withdrawand stand aloof fromit
In the language of Emerson,one should be a
effectually."85
in order to effectsocialchange,thatis, one
"nonconformist"
muststop "conforming
to usages thathave become dead to
For Kieryou" and playingthe "game of conformity."86
revolution
is
also
an
affair
of
the
mind;it is
kegaard,
chiefly
who enbegun by an ironist,a masterof self-transcendence,
deavorsto throwoff"the weightof objectivity"
and destroy
"theactualityhe hostilely
opposes"; his role is "prophetic,. . .
forhe constantly
to
points somethingfuture,"but he cannot
achievehis taskof tearingdown the obsoleteactualityalone;
thisis the task for a people.87Of all the romantics,Stirner
takesthe mostradicalscalpelto the reifiedsocialinstitutions,
vowingto destroy"fixed ideas" whateverformtheytake"people,""party,""society"itself;but radicalas his ends are,
theycan stillbe achievedby the same "peaceable"meansof
and self-transcendence:
self-awakening
'"Higherpowers'exist
them
and
abasingmyself.. . . All
onlythroughmyexalting
84Marx,"A Correspondence
of 1843,"p. 81.
85HenriThoreau,"CivilDisobedience"(1847),in ThePortable
Thoreau(New York:
VikingPress,1947),pp. 123, 131.
86Emerson,Essays,pp. 35, 2-3.
87

Kierkegaard, Concluding,p. 62; Conceptof Irony,p. 278.

This content downloaded from 131.216.164.152 on Tue, 16 Jul 2013 14:28:03 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

114

SOCIAL RESEARCH

slavesbecomefreemenas soon as theyno longerrespecttheir
masteras master."88
Withall theiriconoclasmand extremism,
spurredby the
upsurgeof publicdiscontentin the 1830s and 1840s,the late
romanticthinkersremained true to the spiritof idealism,
sharingtheirpredecessors'beliefin the constitutive
powerof
man's
for
and
the
of
reason,
potential self-renewal,
possibility
evolutionary
change.Behind theirrhetoricwe findthe same
abhorrenceof revolutionary
violenceand desireto transform
theworldpeacefullythatinformedthepoliticalsensibilities
of
romantics
who
suffered
the
traumaof the Terror.The
early
was a guidinglightin theromanimageof "trueGemeinschaft"
ticists'quest fora societythatmakesviolenceand compulsion
obsoletein all its forms,and it is thisquest thatled themto
rediscoverthe value of traditionand social order. Far from
beingan expressionof the reactionary
ideologyof the forces
defeatedin theFrenchRevolutionand marchingcrabwiseinto
the future,the notionof Gemeinschaft
was an attemptat creativereappraisalof thepastwithan eye to securingtheemancipatorygoals of the future. These goals, reflectingthe
romanticists'
unshakableconvictionin the dignityof man,
wereas modernas the meansof furthering
themwerepeacefuland idealistic.All reasonhad to do to secureitsendswas to
realize its constitutive
power and break the veil of facticity
The battlefor the
surroundingobsolete social institutions.
of
the
future
had
to
be
community
foughtand wonnoton the
- itwas to be a battle
barricadesbutin themindsof individuals
of reasonagainstitself,"the battleof reason ... to breakthe
has reduced everything."89
rigidityto whichunderstanding
The romanticquest foran organiccommunity
bringsinto
clear relief what Ricoeur calls the "double edge" of hermeneutics:its penchantforsuspicionand itslongingforcer88Stirner,
Ego, pp. 223, 168.

89G. W. F.
Hegel, Hegel's Logic: Being Part of theEncyclopediaof thePhilosophical

Sciences(1817) (London: OxfordUniversity
Press,1975),p. 53.
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titude.90
It also bringsto the forea quixotic,Utopianelement
in romantichermeneutics,
manifestedin its proponents'reThe
reason
as
a
sole
means
of socialreconstruction.
lianceon
romanticists
vastlyunderestimatedthe resilienceof the bureaucraticstateand thereadinessof theextantpowersto heed
the demandsof reason.Their confidencein the abilityof all
people, regardlessof class, culture,and ethnicheritage,to
come togetheron ideologicallyneutralgroundsof reasonwas
badlyshatteredby the flowof history.The logisticsof awakeningand self-transcendence
provedto be farmorecomplex
than theiroptimisticdeclarationsimplied.And so it should
tide of the
come as no surprisethat,when the revolutionary
in1840ssubsidedwithoutbringingdown the much-despised
of
decline
The
ensued.
a
crisis
of
romantic
stitutions,
thought
in the midnineteenth
romanticism
centurywas in large meaof idealism
withtheefficacy
surea productof a disillusionment
The moodof hopelessness
as a meansof socialreconstruction.
in
at
palpable everywhere Europe this time acceleratedthe
dissolutionof romanticism,
which,in the second half of the
broke
into
severaldivergent,
nineteenth
century,
ideologically
incompatiblecurrentsof thought.Marx's historicalmaterialism,Morris'sguild socialism,and Bakunin's anarchism
representedthe movementto the leftfromthe romanticcenand racial theoriesof Lagarde,
ter; the volkishmysticism
Langbehn,and List reflectedthe parallel movementto the
viewsof the
urban,and internationalist
right.The materialist,
and miliformercontrastedwiththe conservative,
nationalist,
tantlyantimodernist
leaningsof the latter.Both the left-and
successors
of the romanticmovementturnedaway
right-wing
fromthe mediatory
embracspiritof romantichermeneutics,
and showingan increasingreadiingthespiritof partisanship
nessto employviolenceas a vehicleof socialchange.And the
It receiveda newlease on
heritageof romantichermeneutics?
lifein thelatenineteenth
and earlytwentieth
thanks
centuries,
90Ricoeur,

Philosophy,
p. 234.
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to the effortsof WilhelmDiltheyand a brilliantpleiad of his
the spiritof
Germanand Americandiscipleswho resurrected
romanticidealismin the traditionof interpretative
social science.
Romanticism
and Early-Twentieth-Century
Interpretative
Sociology

The impactof romanticideas on modernsocialthoughtwas
facilitated
idealism,
bytherevivalof interestin transcendental
whichshaped much of the intellectuallandscapein the late
nineteenth
and earlytwentieth
centuries,in bothEurope and
in
the UnitedStates.This impactwas feltmostimmediately
the program of cultural studies initiatedby Dilthey and
popularized by Windelband, Rickert,Simmel, and Max
Weber.It is also clearlydiscerniblein earlyAmericansociology, whichderived its inspirationat least in part fromits
German counterpart."The purest vein of Romanticismin
Americansociology,"
pointsout Gouldner,"is ... to be found
in the 'Chicago School,' which had the most concentrated
exposureto theGermantraditionand was,in fact,established
by many(A. W. Small,W. Y. Thomas and R. E. Park) who
trainedin it."91We mayadd to thisthatMead, a
weredirectly
lifelongstudentof romanticphilosophy,studiedwithDilthey
and at one timeseriouslycontemplatedwritinga dissertation
underhisguidance,whileCooley,himselfnota Chicagoanbut
was a
a figureinfluential
among the Chicago interactionists,
a
understanding" procedure
strongadvocateof "sympathetic
to the methodof Verstehen.
resemblance
an
bearing uncanny
and socialinteractionism
cultural
science
of
The proponents
91Gouldner,ForSociology,
p. 345. The impactof idealistthoughton interactionist
and
sociologyis discussedin DmitriN. Shalin,"The Genesisof SocialInteractionism
Humboldt
ofSocial
Journal
of Macro-and Microsociological
Differentiation
Paradigms,"
American
Relations6 (1978): 3-38, and "Pragmatismand Social Interactionism,"
SociologicalReview51 (1986).
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shared ground witha contemporaneouscurrentof thought
whichwas particusometimesreferredto as neoromanticism,
in
some
elements
of it can be
larlystrong Germany,although
in the
detectedin thePopulistand theProgressive
movements
United States. Its distinguishing
characteristics
included a
keen concernfor the ossifyingpropensitiesof bureaucratic
an aversionto rationalism
and dualism,and a
rationalization,
stronginterestin romanticorganicism,all of whichcontributed to the makingsof interpretative
sociology.The affinity
betweenthe two,however,was onlypartial:theinterpretative
thinkersrefusedto endorse the irrationalism
and antimodin this
ernismthatbecamethe mainstream
of neoromanticism
attuned
to
the
century,remainingclosely
mediatoryspiritof
romanticidealism.The extentof theirindebtednessto this
spiritcan be gleaned fromthe numerousallusionsscattered
throughouttheirworks.
as an inspihermeneutics
DiltheycreditedSchleiermacher's
rationforhis own culturalstudies.Simmelquoted extensively
and approvinglyfromthe romanticsources and traced his
to the romanticpremise
notionof "qualitativeindividuality"
thatthe individualis "a 'compendium'of mankind."Rickert
repeatedlystressedthat culturalsciencesderivedtheirconcepts fromthe German idealistphilosophers.Weber effecin his theoryof ideal
tivelyendorsedromanticepistemology
type.And Mead creditedromanticidealistswiththe original
insightintothe dialecticof selfand other.
interpretative
sociologycan be seen as a
Philosophically,
of
romantic
idealismto social reality.
systematic
application
The veryformof Simmel'sfamousquery "How is society
possible?"remindsus of Kant's"How is naturepossible?"His
answerwas thatthe objectivestructureof the social worldis
thea priori
without,
isomorphouswith,and incomprehensible
formsof the mind,althoughin the case of social realitythe
mindin questionis notjust thatof an externalobserver,of a
butthe mindof historical
a
individualscomprising
sociologist,
In
Simmel's
needs
"Societal
unification
words,
givensociety.
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no factorsoutsideitsown componentelements,the individuals. . . . The unityof societyis directlyrealized by its own
elementsbecausetheseelementsare themselves
consciousand
units."92The object of interpretative
social scisynthesizing
ence is "the mind-constructed
world"or socialrealityinsofar
as it is broughtintoexistencethroughtheconstitutive
workof
in
of
individualsconsciously
the
social
world
terms
generating
theirtaken-for-granted
beliefsand values.This objectcallsfor
a specialmethodof inquiry,the methodof Verstehen,
whichis
rootedin theassumptionthat"knowledgeof culturaleventsis
whichthe
inconceivableexcept on a basis of the significance
concreteconstellations
of realityhave for us in certainconcrete individualsituations."93
The Americaninteractionists
sounded a similarnote,contendingthata keyquestionfora
- "Whatdoes it mean?"
sociologiststudyinghuman behavior
- can be answered only through "an imaginaryreconstructionof life,"94that sociologistsshould not "follow. . .
the example of the physicalsciences,[for]while
uncritically
the effectof a physicalphenomenondepends exclusively
on
theobjectivenatureof thisphenomenon. . ., theeffectof the
social phenomenondepends in addition on the subjective
standpointtakenby the individualor the group.. . ,"95
The interpretative
approach reveals the familiarcircular
thesisthatthewhole
withthehermeneutical
patternconsistent
mustbe understoodin termsof itsindividualparts,individual
partsin termsof thewhole.Like theirromanticpredecessors,
thinkers
theinterpretative
soughtto bringintoone continuum
mind,self,and society.Man, accordingto them,is a product
and producer of society;societyis social intercourseor a
92
and Social Forms(Chicago: University
Georg Simmel,GeorgSimmelon Individuality
of Chicago Press, 1970), p. 7.
93 Max Weber, The Methodology
oftheSocial Sciences(New York: Free Press, 1949), p.

80.
94C. H.
Journalof Sociology32
Cooley, "The Roots of Social Knowledge," American
77.
68,
(1926):
95W. I. Thomas, W. I. Thomason Social Organizationand Social Personality:
Selected
272.
of
Press,
1966),
p.
Chicago
University
Papers (Chicago:
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universeof discourse.Followingthe principlesof romantic
the interpretative
thinkersshiftedthe focusof
hermeneutics,
macroto microsocialphenomena.
from
sociologicalinquiry
They did not therebyabandon the studyof macrosocialformations(as Weber's analysisof Westerncapitalismwould
readilytestify);
theysimplyendeavoredto telescopetheseinto
the meaningfulactionsof individuals:
andthelike
as "state,"
Suchconcepts
"feudalism,"
"association,"
certaincategories
of humanactions.Henceit is the
designate
to "understandable"
to reducethoseconcepts
taskof sociology
to theactionsof participating
action,thatis,without
exception
individual
men.96
concretebut an
not a substance,
nothing
Societyis certainly
is an
. . . The relation
and theindividual
event.
between
society
...
.
.
.
is
.
mind
.
.
The
is
relation.
mental,
social, society
organic
and themindare aspectsof thesamewhole.. . .97
society
Given these substantiveparallels,one should not be surbetweenthe propoprisedto finda deep ideologicalaffinity
socialscienceand theirromanticprednentsof interpretative
ecessors.The mediatoryspiritof romantichermeneutics
perand interactionist
meatesthe entireedificeof interpretative
thought.It is evidentin Weber'srejectionof the "ethicsof
of thelastviolent
ultimateends" withitsbeliefin the efficacy
to the"ethicsof respondeed and his undividedcommitment
sibility."It bulks large in Dewey'sethicsof means and his
It showsin Simmel's
crusadeon behalfof "greatcommunity."
of "negativefreedom"and Mead's advocacyof "incriticism
mindedness."Inherentin the ideologicalpositions
ternational
of all these thinkersis a longingfor social change free of
violenceand revolutionary
upheavals,a desireto undermine
the politicalappeal of the Rightand the Leftthatwas on the
96 Max Weber, FromMax Weber:Essaysin Sociology(New York: Oxford University
Press, 1946), p. 55.
"' Charles Horton
Cooley, Human ¡Matureand me òocial Urder (lyuz) (New York:
Schocken Books, 1964), pp. 35, 81.
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rise at the time in both the Old and the New Worlds. We may
recall that the principal task of the Vereinfür Sozialpolitikwas
"to achieve by more conservative means the social justice at
which the Marxists aimed. . . ."98 The same desire to rectify
the injustices endemic to laissez-faireliberalism informs the
To combat the
progressiveagenda of American interactionists.
ills of modernity,the latteropenly used the romanticploy of
juxtaposing the idealized past to the conditionsof the present.
The communityof the past theychose as a point of reference
was not the medieval social order but the native,rural,Jeffersonian community, yet the virtues they ascribed to itcontinuity,liberty,participation,cooperation- were the old
German
romantic virtues of free discourse, of Gemeinschaft.
interpretativethinkerswere less apt to invoke the visionof the
golden past as an antidote to the wretchedconditions of the
present (in part because of the indiscriminateuse made of it
by the neoromantics),but their critique of the "iron cage" of
modern bureaucratic civilization had more than a tinge of
nostalgia for the bygone era of the true Gemeinschaft.
Whatever the differences,it was clearly the ideal of free
discourse that inspired the political imaginations of interpretativethinkerson the Continentand in the United States.
What these authors strained to assert is that, however
alienated the social intercourse,it is stillour discourse,and it is
up to us, the participantsin thisdiscourse,to change itscourse
and to transformit into a truly"universal"discourse. We can
do so, the interpretativethinkersbelieved, and we can do so
withoutrecourse to violence, by subjectingto criticalexamination the rational grounds of our discourse, by reevaluating
values and supplanting them withthe new and more rational
ones.
To sum up, early-twentieth-century
interpretativesociology
was an attempt to extend the principles of romantic hermeneuticsto the entiredomain of the social sciences. Its object
98H. Stewart Hughes, Consciousness
and Society:The Réorientation
of EuropeanSocial

1890-1930 (New York: VintageBooks,1961),p. 294.
Thought,
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was the productionof socialrealityas objectiveand meaning- the interdetermination
of reasonand
ful; its majorpremise
tool
its
understanding;
society; methodological
interpretative
the
and itsideal- freediscourse.Withthisshiftin perspective,
not in the
focusof sociologicalanalysisbecame microscopic,
sense thatsocietyas a wholemovedout of thereachof interbut in the sense thatthe wholeof society
pretativethinkers,
was to be systematically
reduced to the predicativeactivities
and rationalschemesof understanding
employedbyitsmembers.A prioricategoriesand valuesare the meansof productionof socialrealityas objectiveand meaningful;usingthem
skillfullyand knowledgeably,membersof society impart
rational-logical
qualitiesto reality,wade throughthe uncertaintiesof dailylife,conferon each othersocialstatus,and in
the processof doing so perpetuatethe social order. To the
thisorderappearsas a thing
of socialintercourse
participants
in itself,a superhumanentitybeyondtheircontroland power.
But thisis onlyan appearance.The social order,withall its
rigiditiesand inequities,is a productof human intercourse
which produces individualsas historicalindividualsat the
same timethatit is producedby themas the historicaluniverse of discourse.The structureof the social order is periodicallyexploded by prophets and charismaticleaders
whose reflexivepower liftsthe veils thrownover the transcendentaldomain of a prioribeliefsand values and forces
humansto realizetheirresponsibility
forthe waythingsare.
The taskof interpretative
sociologyis to aid in thisprocessof
But
since
thisprocessneverends- bringing
démystification.
downold reifications
clearsthewayforthenewones- thetask
of interpretative
one. That is to
sociologyis a never-ending
is a Sisypheanlaborthatmustbeginanew
say,démystification
themomentitis completed,and so thetaskof hermeneutically
groundedsocial scienceis to ensure thatthistranscendence
remainsan ongoingendeavor.
There is a characteristic
fusionof the normativeand the
endemic
to
the
descriptive
projectof sociologicalhermeneutics
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and manifestedin its idealistic approach that firstimputes a
"true" essence to the individual and societyand then proceeds
to demonstrate how this essence, perverted in the existent
reality,can be recovered through self-consciouseffortsof individuals. The individual, according to this mode of reasoning, is a species being, albeit reduced to a specimen; societyis
discourse, albeit reified and compulsive. What is, is judged
here by the standards of what ought to be, and what ought to
be is proferredas an ideal that is bound to come about when
men begin to live up to their true essence. This fusion of the
normativeand the descriptiveis the legacy of transcendental
idealism, the legacy inheritedby twentieth-century
interpretative thinkersand amply manifested in their abhorrence of
violence, commitmentto libertyand order, and penchant for
politicalmediation and meliorism.The interpretativethinkers
did not abandon their trust in reason and peaceful means
of social reconstruction when revolutions swept over
Europe and violence seemed the only solution to the vexing
problems of modernity.We have every reason to call their
thinkingUtopian (in the sense in which the term was used by
Mannheim), but we cannot deny their humanism or the relevance of their ideas to contemporarypolitical discourse. The
hermeneuticalperspectiveon societyas a universeof discourse
perpetuated by self-consciousindividuals reflectsits proponents' profound trustin the freedom and dignityof man. It is
an outlook permeated withhumanisticvalues shared by those
who believe in the possibilityof a communitythat combines
unity and diversity.
It is also an outlook that is flawed by certain biases, a
perspectivewithblind spots of its own. If the social process is
fundamentallya process of production of social reality as
objective and meaningful,as interpretativesociologistsimply,
then the questions to ponder are: What are the means of
productionof social realityas objectiveand meaningful?Who
controls these means of production? How is participationin
social discourse affectedby one's status and class? How is the
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process of universalizationand generation structured?Which
are the historicallyspecific modes of production of social
realityas objectiveand meaningful?All these questions are of
paramount sociological importance.The failure to meet them
head-on typicalof much of interpretativesociology makes it
vulnerable to the charges of an astructuraland conservative
bias.
Is this failure a legacy of romantic idealism? That the
idealistictendencyto exaggerate the claims of reason, to mix
the real withthe ideal, and to treatthe subjectof the historical
process as a unitaryphenomenon mighthave contributedto it
is undeniable. That hermeneuticallygrounded social theoryis
inherentlyincapable of answeringthese pertinentsociological
questions is far from certain. A reexamination of Marx's
romanticheritage now under way suggeststhat romantichermeneutics is not incompatible with class analysis." The current debate about Lukács's romanticperiod also points in this
direction.100AnthonyGiddens's work is one more example of
recent attempts to combine structural and hermeneutical
analysis.101Whetherthese effortswill bear fruitremains to be
seen. One thingis clear, however: If interpretativesociologyis
to succeed as a full-fledgedsociological theory,it has to address these questions directly,that is, it has to deal withissues
of inequalityand exploitation,and it has to maintaina fruitful
dialogue with alternativesociological perspectives.
99P. Breines, "Marxism, Romanticism,and the Case of
Georg Lukács: Notes on
Some Recent Sources and Situations,"Studiesin Romanticism16 (1971).
100Breines, "Marxism";
Löwy, GoergLukács.
101
Anthony Giddens, New Rules of SociologicalMethod:A PositiveCritiqueof InterpretativeSociologies(New York: Basic Books, 1976).

* Thisis a revision
of a paperpresentedat the78thAnnualMeetingof theAmerican
Association.
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to Professors
PeterBerger,Ira
Sociological
Cohen,David Zaret,and Lon Shelbyfortheircommentson an earlierdraft.
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